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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-03" category="info" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.25.0 -->
  <front>
    <title abbrev="tls1.2-frozen">TLS 1.2 is in Feature Freeze</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-03"/>
    <author fullname="Rich Salz">
      <organization>Akamai Technologies</organization>
      <address>
        <email>rsalz@akamai.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Nimrod Aviram">
      <organization/>
      <address>
        <email>nimrod.aviram@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2024" month="December" day="09"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Transport Layer Security</workgroup>
    <keyword>TLS</keyword>
    <keyword>features</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 67?>

<t>Use of TLS 1.3 is growing and fixes some known deficiencies in TLS 1.2.
This document specifies that outside of
urgent security fixes, new TLS Exporter Labels, or new
Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs,
no new features will be approved for TLS 1.2.
This prescription does not pertain to DTLS (in any DTLS version); it pertains to
TLS only.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Transport Layer Security Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:tls@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/tlswg/tls12-frozen"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 77?>

<section anchor="sec-reasons">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Use of TLS 1.3 <xref target="TLS13"/> is growing, and it
fixes most known deficiencies with TLS 1.2 <xref target="TLS12"/>, such as
encrypting more of the traffic so that it is not readable by outsiders and
removing most cryptographic primitives now considered weak. Importantly, TLS
1.3 enjoys robust security proofs.</t>
      <t>Both versions have several extension points, so items like new cryptographic
algorithms, new supported groups (formerly "named curves"),  etc., can be
added without defining a new protocol. This document specifies that outside of
urgent security fixes, and the exceptions listed in <xref target="iana"/>,
no new features will be approved for TLS 1.2.
This prescription does not pertain to DTLS (in any DTLS version); it pertains to
TLS only.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCPÂ 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

</section>
    <section anchor="implications-for-post-quantum-cryptography">
      <name>Implications for post-quantum cryptography</name>
      <t>Cryptographically relevant quantum computers, once available, will have a
huge impact on RSA, FFDH, and ECC which are currently used in TLS.
In 2016, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology started a
multi-year effort to standardize algorithms that will be "safe"
once quantum computers are feasible <xref target="PQC"/>. First IETF discussions happened
around the same time <xref target="CFRGSLIDES"/>.</t>
      <t>In 2024 NIST released standards for <xref target="ML-KEM"/>, <xref target="ML-DSA"/>, and <xref target="SLH-DSA"/>.
While industry was waiting for NIST to finish standardization, the
IETF has had several efforts underway.
A working group was formed in early 2023 to work on use of PQC in IETF protocols,
<xref target="PQUIPWG"/>.
Several other working groups, including TLS <xref target="TLSWG"/>,
are working on
drafts to support hybrid algorithms and identifiers, for use during a
transition from classic to a post-quantum world.</t>
      <t>For TLS it is important to note that the focus of these efforts is TLS 1.3
or later.
Put bluntly, post-quantum cryptography for
TLS 1.2 WILL NOT be supported (see <xref target="iana"/>).</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>IANA will stop accepting registrations for any TLS parameters <xref target="TLS13REG"/>
except for the following:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>TLS Exporter Labels</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Entries in any other TLS protocol registry should have an indication like
"For TLS 1.3 or later" in their entry.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="TLS12">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2</title>
            <author fullname="T. Dierks" initials="T." surname="Dierks"/>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="August" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5246"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5246"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TLS13">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="August" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TLS13REG">
          <front>
            <title>IANA Registry Updates for TLS and DTLS</title>
            <author fullname="Joseph A. Salowey" initials="J. A." surname="Salowey">
              <organization>Venafi</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Sean Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner">
              <organization>sn3rd</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="3" month="November" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document updates the changes to TLS and DTLS IANA registries
   made in RFC 8447.  It adds a new value "D" for discouraged to the
   recommended column of the selected TLS registries and adds a
   "Comments" column to all active registries.

   This document updates the following RFCs: 3749, 5077, 4680, 5246,
   5705, 5878, 6520, 7301, and 8447.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis-10"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="ML-KEM" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final">
          <front>
            <title>Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2024" month="August"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ML-DSA" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final">
          <front>
            <title>Module-Lattice-Based Key Digital Signature Standard</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2024" month="August"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SLH-DSA" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/205/final">
          <front>
            <title>Stateless Hash-Based Key-Digital Signature Standard</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2024" month="August"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PQC" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography">
          <front>
            <title>Post-Quantum Cryptography</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2017" month="January"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CFRGSLIDES" target="https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/95/slides/slides-95-cfrg-4.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>Post Quantum Secure Cryptography Discussion</title>
            <author initials="D." surname="McGrew" fullname="David McGrew">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PQUIPWG" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/pquip/about/">
          <front>
            <title>Post-Quantum Use in Protocols</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TLSWG" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/tls/about/">
          <front>
            <title>Transport Layer Security</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
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