<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc [
  <!ENTITY nbsp    "&#160;">
  <!ENTITY zwsp   "&#8203;">
  <!ENTITY nbhy   "&#8209;">
  <!ENTITY wj     "&#8288;">
]>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?>
<!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc version 1.7.21 (Ruby 2.6.10) -->
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-05" category="info" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.25.0 -->
  <front>
    <title abbrev="tls1.2-frozen">TLS 1.2 is in Feature Freeze</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-05"/>
    <author fullname="Rich Salz">
      <organization>Akamai Technologies</organization>
      <address>
        <email>rsalz@akamai.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Nimrod Aviram">
      <organization/>
      <address>
        <email>nimrod.aviram@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2024" month="December" day="20"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Transport Layer Security</workgroup>
    <keyword>TLS</keyword>
    <keyword>features</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 67?>

<t>Use of TLS 1.3 is growing and fixes some known deficiencies in TLS 1.2.
This document specifies that outside of
urgent security fixes, new TLS Exporter Labels, or new
Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs,
no changes will be approved for TLS 1.2.
This prescription does not pertain to DTLS (in any DTLS version); it pertains to
TLS only.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Transport Layer Security Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:tls@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/tlswg/tls12-frozen"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 77?>

<section anchor="sec-reasons">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Use of TLS 1.3 <xref target="TLS13"/> is growing, and it
fixes most known deficiencies with TLS 1.2 <xref target="TLS12"/>, such as
encrypting more of the traffic so that it is not readable by outsiders and
removing most cryptographic primitives now considered weak. Importantly, TLS
1.3 enjoys robust security proofs.</t>
      <t>Both versions have several extension points, so items like new cryptographic
algorithms, new supported groups (formerly "named curves"),  etc., can be
added without defining a new protocol. This document specifies that outside of
urgent security fixes, and the exceptions listed in <xref target="iana"/>,
no changes will be approved for TLS 1.2.
This prescription does not pertain to DTLS (in any DTLS version); it pertains to
TLS only.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="implications-for-post-quantum-cryptography">
      <name>Implications for post-quantum cryptography</name>
      <t>Cryptographically relevant quantum computers, once available, will have a
huge impact on RSA, FFDH, and ECC which are currently used in TLS.
In 2016, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology started a
multi-year effort to standardize algorithms that will be "safe"
once quantum computers are feasible <xref target="PQC"/>. First IETF discussions happened
around the same time <xref target="CFRGSLIDES"/>.</t>
      <t>In 2024 NIST released standards for <xref target="ML-KEM"/>, <xref target="ML-DSA"/>, and <xref target="SLH-DSA"/>.
While industry was waiting for NIST to finish standardization, the
IETF has had several efforts underway.
A working group was formed in early 2023 to work on use of PQC in IETF protocols,
<xref target="PQUIPWG"/>.
Several other working groups, including TLS <xref target="TLSWG"/>,
are working on
drafts to support hybrid algorithms and identifiers, for use during a
transition from classic to a post-quantum world.</t>
      <t>For TLS it is important to note that the focus of these efforts is exclusively
TLS 1.3 or later.
Put bluntly, post-quantum cryptography for
TLS 1.2 WILL NOT be supported (see <xref target="iana"/>) at any time and anyone wishing
to deploy post-quantum cryptography should expect to be using TLS 1.3.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>This entire document is about security, and provides post-quantum concerns
as an additional reason to upgrade to TLS 1.3.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>IANA will stop accepting registrations for any TLS parameters <xref target="TLS13REG"/>
except for the following:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>TLS Exporter Labels</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Entries in any other TLS protocol registry should have an indication like
"For TLS 1.3 or later" in their entry.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="TLS12">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2</title>
            <author fullname="T. Dierks" initials="T." surname="Dierks"/>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="August" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5246"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5246"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TLS13">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="Eric Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="14" month="September" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) protocol.  TLS allows client/server applications to communicate
   over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
   tampering, and message forgery.

   This document updates RFCs 5705, 6066, 7627, and 8422 and obsoletes
   RFCs 5077, 5246, 6961, 8422, and 8446.  This document also specifies
   new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-11"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TLS13REG">
          <front>
            <title>IANA Registry Updates for TLS and DTLS</title>
            <author fullname="Joseph A. Salowey" initials="J. A." surname="Salowey">
              <organization>Venafi</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Sean Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner">
              <organization>sn3rd</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="3" month="November" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document updates the changes to TLS and DTLS IANA registries
   made in RFC 8447.  It adds a new value "D" for discouraged to the
   recommended column of the selected TLS registries and adds a
   "Comments" column to all active registries.

   This document updates the following RFCs: 3749, 5077, 4680, 5246,
   5705, 5878, 6520, 7301, and 8447.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis-10"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="ML-KEM" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final">
          <front>
            <title>Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2024" month="August"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ML-DSA" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final">
          <front>
            <title>Module-Lattice-Based Key Digital Signature Standard</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2024" month="August"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SLH-DSA" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/205/final">
          <front>
            <title>Stateless Hash-Based Key-Digital Signature Standard</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2024" month="August"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PQC" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography">
          <front>
            <title>Post-Quantum Cryptography</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2017" month="January"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CFRGSLIDES" target="https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/95/slides/slides-95-cfrg-4.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>Post Quantum Secure Cryptography Discussion</title>
            <author initials="D." surname="McGrew" fullname="David McGrew">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PQUIPWG" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/pquip/about/">
          <front>
            <title>Post-Quantum Use in Protocols</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TLSWG" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/tls/about/">
          <front>
            <title>Transport Layer Security</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
  </back>
  <!-- ##markdown-source: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-->

</rfc>
