External Keys For Use In Internet X.509 Certificates

Introduction

External Value The id-external-value algorithm identifier is used for identifying a public key or signature which is provided as a reference to external data. EDNOTE: for prototyping purposes, id-external-value ::= 1.3.6.1.4.1.22554.4.2 The corresponding subjectPublicKey is the DER encoding of the following structure: Upon retrieval of the referenced data, the hash of the OCTET STRING of the retrieved data (removing base64 encoding as per if necessary) MUST be verified using hashAlg to match the ExternalPublicKey.hash value.

External Public Key When used with a public key, algorithm parameters for id-external-value are absent. When ExternalValue is placed into a SubjectPublicKeyInfo.subjectPublicKey, the ExternalValue.location MUST refer to a DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo, which MAY be base64 encoded as per for easier transport over text protocols.

IANA Considerations ## Object Identifier Allocations

Module Registration - SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier

Decimal: IANA Assigned - Replace TBDMOD
Description: EXTERNAL-PUBKEY-2023 - id-mod-external-pubkey
References: This Document

Object Identifier Registrations - SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms

Attest Statement
- Decimal: IANA Assigned - Replace TBDOID
- Description: id-external-value
- References: This Document

Security Considerations There are no security implications to externalizing a public key from a certificate as described in this draft. It is of course possible for a malicious actor to replace or tamper with the public key data at the referenced location, but since the hash of the public key data is included in the signed certificate, any such tampering will be detected and the certificate verification will fail. For this reason, external public key data MAY be served over an insecure channel such as HTTP.

CSRs and CT logs In practice, situations will arise where the ExternalPublicKey.location refers to a location which is not publicly available either because it is in a local keystore, on a private network, or no longer being hosted. Not having the public key in a certificate signing request (CSR) could make it substantially harder for CAs to perform vetting of the key, for example for cryptographic strength or checking for prior revocation due to key compromise. A certificate requester MUST make the full public key available to the CA at the time of certificate request either by ensuring that the link in the ExternalPublicKey.location is visible to the CA, or by supplying the full public key to the CA out of band. Not having the public key in Certificate Transparency (CT) logs could make it substantially harder for researchers to perform auditing tasks on CT logs. This may require additional CT mechanisms.

Appendices

ASN.1 Module

Samples Here is a sample of a Kyber1024 end entity certificate with an external public key. A trust anchor certificate using the algorithm ecdsaWithSHA256 is provided so that the Kyber1024 End Entity certificate can be verified. This is a modest example demonstrating a 550 byte Kyber1024 certificate and a 2.2 kb external Kyber1024 public key. This "compression" effect will be even more pronounced with algorithms such as Classic McEliece which have public keys in the hundreds of kilobytes; with the external public key mechanism, the size of the certificate remains constant regardless of how large the externalized subject public key is. End entity Kyber1024 Certificate with ExternalValue public key: For illustrative purposes, the SubjectPublicKeyInfo within the end entity certificate decodes as: The external public key object referenced by the end entity certificate is: For illustrative purposes, the key data, which is itself a SubjectPublicKeyInfo, decodes as: The following trust anchor certificate can be used to validate the above end entity certificate.

Intellectual Property Considerations None.

Contributors and Acknowledgements This document incorporates contributions and comments from a large group of experts. The Editors would especially like to acknowledge the expertise and tireless dedication of the following people, who attended many long meetings and generated millions of bytes of electronic mail and VOIP traffic over the past year in pursuit of this document: Serge Mister (Entrust). We are grateful to all, including any contributors who may have been inadvertently omitted from this list. This document borrows text from similar documents, including those referenced below. Thanks go to the authors of those documents. "Copying always makes things easier and less error prone" - .

Making contributions Additional contributions to this draft are welcome. Please see the working copy of this draft at, as well as open issues at: https://github.com/EntrustCorporation/draft-ounsworth-pq-external-keys