]> SGNL

atul@sgnl.ai

Capital One

george.fletcher@capitalone.com

Microsoft

pieter.kasselman@microsoft.com

sec oauth Microservices OAuth JWT token exchange Transaction Tokens (Txn-Tokens) enable workloads in a trusted domain to ensure that user identity and authorization context of an external programmatic request, such as an API invocation, is preserved and available to all workloads that are invoked as part of processing such a request. Txn-Tokens also enable workloads within the trusted domain to optionally immutably assert to downstream workloads that they were invoked in the call chain of the request.

Introduction Modern computing architectures often use multiple independently running components called workloads. In many cases, external invocations through externally visible interfaces such as APIs result in a number of internal workloads being invoked in order to process the external invocation. These workloads often run in virtually or physically isolated networks. These networks and the workloads running within their perimeter may be compromised by attackers through software supply chain, privileged user compromise or other attacks. Workloads compromised through external attacks, malicious insiders or software errors can cause any or all of the following unauthorized actions: Invocations of workloads in the network without any external invocation being present Arbitrary user impersonation Parameter modification or augmentation The results of these actions are unauthorised access to resources.

Overview Transaction Tokens (Txn-Token) are a means to mitigate damage from such attacks or spurious invocations. A valid Txn-Token indicates a valid external invocation. They ensure that the identity of the user or a workload that made the external request is preserved throughout subsequent workload invocations. They preserve any context such as: Parameters of the original call Environmental factors, such as IP address of the original caller Any computed context that needs to be preserved in the call chain. This includes information that was not in the original request to the external endpoint. Cryptographically protected Txn-Token ensure that downstream workloads cannot make unauthorized modifications to such information, and cannot make spurious calls without the presence of an external trigger.

What are Transaction Tokens? Txn-Tokens are short-lived, signed JWTs that assert the identity of a user or a workload and assert an authorization context. The authorization context provides information expected to remain constant during the execution of a call as it passes through multiple workloads. When necessary, a Txn-Token may include embedded tokens, as described in . This is called Nested Txn-Token. This nesting enables workloads in a call chain to assert their invocation during the call chain to downstream workloads.

Creating Txn-Tokens

Leaf Txn-Tokens Txn-Tokens are typically created when a workload is invoked using an endpoint that is externally visible, and is authorized using a separate mechanism, such as an OAuth token or an OpenID Connect token. We call this token "Leaf Txn-Token". This workload then performs an OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange to obtain a Txn-Token. To do this, it invokes a special Token Service (the Txn-Token Service) and provides context that is sufficient for it to generate a Txn-Token. This context MAY include: The external authorization token (e.g. the OAuth access token) A previously created Txn-Token (leaf or nested) Parameters that are required to be bound for the duration of this call Additional context, such as the incoming IP address, User Agent information, or other context that can help the Txn-Token Service to issue the Txn-Token The Txn-Token Service responds to a successful invocation by generating a Txn-Token. The calling workload then uses the Txn-Token to authorize its calls to subsequent workloads. Subsequent workloads may obtain Txn-Tokens of their own.

Nested Txn-Tokens A workload within the call chain of such an external call MAY generate a new Nested Txn-Token. To generate the Nested Txn-Token, it creates a self-signed JWT Embedded Token that includes the received Txn-Token by value. Subsequent workloads can therefore know that the signing workload was in the path of the call chain.

Txn-Token Lifetime Txn-Tokens are expected to be short-lived (order of minutes, e.g. 5 minutes), and as a result MAY be used only for the expected duration of an external invocation. If a long-running process such as an batch or offline task is involved, it can use a separate mechanism to perform the external invocation, but the resulting Txn-Token SHALL still be short-lived.

Benefits of Txn-Tokens Txn-Tokens help prevent spurious invocations by ensuring that a workload receiving an invocation can independently verify the user or workload on whose behalf an external call was made and any context relevant to the processing of the call. Through the presence of additional signatures on the Txn-Token, a workload receiving an invocation can also independently verify that specific workloads were within the path of the call before it was invoked.

Txn-Token Issuance and Usage Flows

Basic Flow shows the basic flow of how Txn-Tokens are used in an a multi-workload environment.

External endpoint is invoked using conventional authorization scheme such as access token External endpoint provides context and incoming authorization (e.g. access token) to the Txn-Token Service Txn-Token Service mints a Txn-Token that provides immutable context for the transaction and returns it to the requester The external endpoint initiates a call to an internal microservice and provides the Txn-Token as authorization Subsequent calls to other internal microservices use the same Txn-Token to authorize calls Responses are provided to callers based on successful authorization by the invoked microservices. External client is provided a response to the external invocation

Nested Txn-Token Flow shows an internal microservice generating a Nested Txn-Token in the flow

In the diagram above, steps 1-5 are the same as in . An internal microservice determines it needs to generate a Nested Txn-Token. It uses its own private key to generate a Nested Txn-Token. The internal microservice uses the Nested Txn-Token to authorize calls to downstream services Responses are provided to callers based on successful authorization by the invoked microservices. External client is provided a response to the external invocation

Replacement Txn-Token Flow An intermediate service may decide to obtain a replacement Txn-Token from the Txn-Token service. That flow is described below in

In the diagram above, steps 1-5 are the same as in An intermediate service determines that it needs to obtain a Replacement Txn-Token. It requests a Replacement Txn-Token from the Txn-Token Service. It passes the incoming Txn-Token in the request, along with any additional context it needs to send the Txn-Token Service. The Txn-Token Service responds with a replacement Txn-Token The service that requested the Replacement Txn-Token uses that Txn-Token for downstream call authorization Responses are provided to callers based on successful authorization by the invoked microservices. External client is provided a response to the external invocation

Notational Conventions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Terminology

Workload:

An independent computational unit that can autonomously receive and process invocations, and can generate invocations of other workloads. Examples of workloads include containerized microservices, monolithic services and infrastructure services such as managed databases.

Trust Domain:

A virtually or physically separated network, which contains two or more workloads. The workloads within an Trust Domain may be invoked only through published interfaces. A Trust Domain must have a name that is used as the aud (audience) value in Txn-Tokens.

External Endpoint:

A published interface to an Trust Domain that results in the invocation of a workload within the Trust Domain.

Call Chain:

A sequence of invocations that results from the invocation of an external endpoint.

Transaction Token (Txn-Token):

A signed JWT that has a short lifetime, which provides immutable information about the user or workload, certain parameters of the call and certain contextual attributes of the call. A Txn-Token may contain a nested Txn-Token.

Leaf Txn-Token:

A Txn-Token that does not contain a txn_token claim in its JWT body.

Nested Txn-Token:

A JWT Embedded Token that embeds a Txn-Token by value.

Authorization Context:

A JSON object containing a set of claims that represent the immutable context of a call chain.

Transaction Token Service (Txn-Token Service):

A special service within the Trust Domain, which issues Txn-Tokens to requesting workloads.

Txn-Token Format A Txn-Token is a JSON Web Token protected by a JSON Web Signature . The following is true in a Txn-Token:

JWT Header In the JWT Header: The typ claim MUST be present and MUST have the value txn_token. Key rotation of the signing key SHOULD be supported through the use of a kid claim. is a non-normative example of the JWT Header of a Txn-Token

JWT Body

Common Claims The JWT body MUST have the following claims regardless of whether the Txn-Token is a Leaf Txn-Token or a Nested Txn-Token: An iss claim, whose value is a URN that uniquely identifies the workload or the Txn-Token Service that created the Txn-Token. An iat claim, whose value is the time at which the Txn-Token was created. An exp claim, whose value is the time at which the Txn-Token expires. Note that if this claim is in a Nested Txn-Token, then this exp value MUST NOT exceed the exp value of the Txn-Token included in the JWT Body.

Leaf Txn-Token Claims The following claims MUST be present in the JWT body of a Leaf Txn-Token: A tid claim, whose value is the unique identifier of entire call chain. A sub_id claim, whose value is the unique identifier of the user or workload on whose behalf the call chain is being executed. The format of this claim MAY be a Subject Identifier as specified in . An azc claim, whose value is a JSON object that contains values that remain constant in the call chain. shows a non-normative example of the JWT body of a Leaf Txn-Token:

Nested Txn-Token Claim A Nested Txn-Token is a JWT Embedded Token , which embeds a Txn-Token by value. The following claims MUST be present in a Nested Txn-Token: A type claim, whose value is urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn_token. A token claim, whose value is an encoded JWT representation of a Txn-Token. shows a non-normative example the JWT body of a nested Txn-Token

Requesting Leaf Txn-Tokens A workload requests a Txn-Token from a Transaction Token Service using OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange . The request to obtain a Txn-Token using this method is called a Txn-Token Request, and a success response is called a Txn-Token Response. A Txn-Token Request is a Token Exchange Request, as described in Section 2.1 of with additional parameters. A Txn-Token Response is a OAuth 2.0 token endpoint response, as described in Section 5 of , where the token_type in the response has the value txn_token. The Transaction Token Service acts as an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server. The requesting workload acts as the OAuth 2.0 Client, which authenticates itself to the Transaction Token Service through mechanisms defined in OAuth 2.0.

Txn-Token Request A Txn-Token Request is an OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange Request, as described in Section 2.1 of , with an additional parameter in the request. The following is true of the Txn-Token Request: The audience value MUST be set to the Trust Domain name. The requested_token_type value MUST be urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn_token. The subject_token value MUST be the external token received by the workload that authorized the call. The subject_token_type value MUST be present and indicate the type of the authorization token present in the subject_token parameter. The following additional parameter MUST be present in a Txn-Token Request: A parameter named azc , whose value is a JSON object. This object contains any information the Transaction Token Service needs to understand the context of the incoming request. shows a non-normative example of a Txn-Token Request.

Txn-Token Response A successful response to a Txn-Token Request by a Transaction Token Service is called a Txn-Token Response. If the Transaction Token Service responds with an error, the error response is as described in Section 5.2 of . The following is true of a Txn-Token Response: The token_type value MUST be set to txn_token. The access_token value MUST be the Txn-Token. The response MUST NOT include the values expires_in, refresh_token and scope. shows a non-normative example of a Txn-Token Response.

Creating Replacement Txn-Tokens A workload within a call chain may request the Transaction Token Server to replace a Txn-Token. Replacement Txn-Tokens are Leaf Txn-Tokens. Workloads MAY request replacement Txn-Tokens in order to change (add to, remove or modify) the asserted values within a Txn-Token, to remove nesting and / or reduce token bloat.

Transaction Token Server Responsibilities A Transaction Token Server replacing a Txn-Token must consider that modifying previously asserted values from existing Txn-Tokens can completely negate the benefits of Txn-Tokens. When issuing replacement Txn-Tokens, a Transaction Token Server therefore: MAY enable modifications to asserted values that reduce the scope of permitted actions MAY enable reduction of token bloat by removing nesting, and placing workload identifiers as asserted values instead MAY enable additional asserted values SHOULD NOT enable modification to asserted values that expand the scope of permitted actions

Replacement Txn-Token Request To request a replacement Txn-Token, the requester makes a Txn-Token Request but includes the Txn-Token to be replaced as the value of the subject_token parameter.

Replacement Txn-Token Response A successful response by the Transaction Token Server to a Replacement Txn-Token Request is a Txn-Token Response

Removing Nesting A Replacement Txn-Token Request MAY include a Nested Txn-Token in its request. If the request is successful, the Transaction Token Server SHALL always respond with a Leaf Txn-Token. If the Replacement Txn-Token Request has a Nested Txn-Token in the request's subject_token parameter, then the Transaction Token Server MAY include information about services that had signed the Nested Txn-Token that is requested to be replaced. If the Transaction Token Server wishes to include information about any nested Txn-Token signers, then it SHALL include a field named previous_signers in the azc value of the Txn-Token that it issues. The value of this field MUST be an array of strings. Each string is the the value of the iss field of a Nested Txn-Tokens received in the Replacement Txn-Token Request. Note that A Nested Txn-Token is a recursive structure, and the iss value is present at each level of nesting The Transaction Token Server MAY choose to include or exclude any iss value in the previous_signers field of the Txn-Token it generates.

Creating Nested Txn-Tokens A workload within a call chain MAY create a Nested Txn-Token. It does so by embedding the Txn-Token it receives by value in a JWT Embedded Token . Nested Txn-Tokens are self-signed and not requested from a separate service. The expiration time of a enclosing Txn-Token MUST NOT exceed the expiration time of an embedded Txn-Token.

IANA Considerations This memo includes no request to IANA.

Security Considerations

Mutual Authentication of the Txn-Token Request A Transaction Token Service MUST ensure that it authenticates any workloads requesting Txn-Tokens. In order to do so: It MUST name a limited, pre-configured set of workloads that MAY request Txn-Tokens. It MUST individually authenticate the requester as being one of the name requesters. It SHOULD rely on mechanisms, such as , to securely authenticate the requester. It SHOULD NOT rely on insecure mechanisms, such as long-lived shared secrets to authenticate the requesters. The requesting workload MUST have a pre-configured location for the Transaction Token Service. It SHOULD rely on mechanisms, such as , to securely authenticate the Transaction Token Service before making a Txn-Token Request.

Sender Constrained Tokens Although Txn-Tokens are short-lived, they may be sender constrained as an additional layer of defence to prevent them from being re-used by a compromised or malicious workload under the control of a hostile actor.

Access Tokens When creating Txn-Tokens, the Txn-Token MUST NOT contain the Access Token presented to the resource server. If an Access Token is included in a Txn-Token, an attacker may obtain a Txn-Token, extract the Access Token, and replay it to the Resource Server. Txn-Token expiry does not protect against this attack since the Access Token may remain valid even after the Txn-Token has expired.

In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849. [STANDARDS-TRACK] JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted. JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and an IANA registry defined by that specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification. A Uniform Resource Name (URN) is a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) that is assigned under the "urn" URI scheme and a particular URN namespace, with the intent that the URN will be a persistent, location-independent resource identifier. With regard to URN syntax, this document defines the canonical syntax for URNs (in a way that is consistent with URI syntax), specifies methods for determining URN-equivalence, and discusses URI conformance. With regard to URN namespaces, this document specifies a method for defining a URN namespace and associating it with a namespace identifier, and it describes procedures for registering namespace identifiers with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). This document obsoletes both RFCs 2141 and 3406. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This specification defines a protocol for an HTTP- and JSON-based Security Token Service (STS) by defining how to request and obtain security tokens from OAuth 2.0 authorization servers, including security tokens employing impersonation and delegation. NRI Ping Identity Microsoft Google Salesforce Amazon Coinbase Fastly E&Y Hellō Dipartimento per la trasformazione digitale della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri Italy Cloud Native Computing Foundation

Acknowledgements

Contributors SPIRL

evan@spirl.com

Arm Ltd.

Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com